Coping effectively and compassionately with traumatic post-earthquake situations such as occurred in Kobe obviously places a tremendous burden on financial, physical, social and other resources. In many respects the Japanese government deserves substantial credit in terms of the speed and scale of reconstruction and rehabilitation which has taken place since 17 January 1995. Most roads, bridges, port facilities and other damaged infrastructure has been rebuilt or is will on the way to completion, seeking to return Kobe to the city it was before the earthquake struck.

Conversely, as this report indicates, far too little was done in the days immediately following the quake. Governmental response to date has not been sufficient in terms of protecting the basic housing rights of those victimized one year ago. The events in Kobe, as dramatic as they were and still are, provide a unique opportunity for public authorities throughout Japan to ensure that the many mistakes made in the rehabilitation process - as well as some serious errors of judgement made by various governments prior to the Great Hanshin disaster - are not allowed to occur again.

Indeed, there is now such a wide range of information available, whether geological, technological, physical, social and otherwise, that current data clearly allows for decisions, policies and other actions by government to be made now which will assist in significantly mitigating the frightful scale of human misery which followed the Kobe quake and which continues to haunt so many innocent victims of the early morning in January when the earth shook like never before.

Unfortunately, it does not appear to Habitat International Coalition that those public officials responsible for developing the post-quake plan, particularly regarding issues relating to housing, actively sought out all possible sources of information which could have been used to ensure a more people-oriented, human rights-consistent approach. Much could have been learned, for instance, from the measures taken by governments, in cooperation with victims, in India and Mexico following the devastating Mexico City (1985), Maharastra (1993) and Northridge (1994) earthquakes to ensure that housing needs were met as quickly as possible and in a manner as closely as possible to the demands, wishes and rights of those who lost their homes.

Indeed, the HIC team inquired on several occasions during meetings with those responsible for drafting aspects of the reconstruction plans as to whether they drew on the post-quake experiences elsewhere in Kobe plans. None of those questioned indicated that they had done so, or even that such an examination would have yielded any assistance had they chosen to analyze policies which worked in other settings. This lack of interest in solutions pursued elsewhere by Japanese officials is difficult to understand and it is indeed hoped that such useful information will not be ignored in the future.

A special problem of note pertains to low-income households that were renting old traditional wooden buildings that are located in dense areas like Nagata-ku. Many of these buildings were constructed before building regulations came into force in the 1950s and were modified in the 1960s. The owners are often old people who depend on the low rental incomes for their survival. The inability to reconstruct houses is as much a liability for them as it is for their previous tenants. Many of them are therefore eager to consider other options of long term lease of land to the government or tenants groups to solve their problems collectively. This is in keeping with the tight network of relationships that exists in these areas.

The basis on which the city-Government is rejecting these options is the lack of public land and complexity of the process of negotiated land consolidation and redevelopment. It is not clear how much land is available and at what locations. However, it is clear that large relocation schemes were not necessary and small-scale redevelopment involving land sharing over 3-5 plots and 15-50 units could be possible. Innovative institutional interventions like intervening in the land market of the city to contain the rise of rental values for 2-4 years; fiscal incentives to convert private rental housing to public housing for 3-5 years; land banking and public purchase of private land in specified zones have not been explored fully. Full participation of all the stake holders in the redevelopment process is a necessary condition for a successful programme. This may not be necessary in the case of public infrastructure, as it is directly in the control of the government, but the interface between public and private can only be bridged through a formal institutional forum for dialogue. In normal conditions, the city council and other fora are more than adequate, however, when such large numbers of people are directly affected, these systems get overloaded and a higher level of public and community participation has been shown to be most effective, as in Mexico city. While the Hyogo Prefecture has tentatively suggested to build housing on private sites, the Kobe city government has consistently and unfortunately refused to give serious consideration to such options.

While the Kobe City Restoration Plan (June 1995), states that the Kobe City Government will ensure the construction of 82, 000 homes between fiscal years 1995-1997, by the time the HIC team left Kobe, in late 1995, not one unit had been constructed. The slow pace with which these measures, which superficially at least show at least some commitment on the part of the government to the provision of public housing, does however raise concerns as to the long-term housing situation facing dwellers in temporary housing sites and elsewhere.

Additionally, only a very meagre and inadequate system of housing credits are available to victims. A loan system for earthquake survivors should be pursued, including the relief of individual debt, or minimally, a debt freeze.

Human rights considerations should clearly play a much more prominent role than they have to date. The Japanese judiciary should give a much wider interpretation of CESCR in Japan, taking into account developments since the 1989 case on article 2 (1) and the experience of other countries in this regard. Lawyers should utilize the provisions of CESCR in their pleadings, and all governments in Japan should clearly do more to incorporate the norms of the Covenant into decision-making processes.

The government should establish an independent commission including representation by victims and independent non-nationals, to determine whether and to what degree the Japanese government is liable for the
PERD housing-related deaths, as well as how concrete measures could be taken as quickly as possible to alleviate the deprivation still facing thousands of earthquake victims a full year after the quake in one of the richest nations on earth.

It is in a spirit of constructive dialogue that HIC would like to offer the following recommendations to all levels of the Japanese government and other relevant actors to ensure that the housing rights of all citizens, particularly those still negatively affected by the earthquake are guaranteed expediently.

a　Ensure the right of all earthquake victims who so request to return to the communities and neighbourhoods in which they were resident prior to the earthquake;

b Guarantee, as a right, the provision of affordable, adequate and centrally located public housing to all temporary housing dwellers who require it;

c Refrain from carrying out or tolerating any forced evictions of earthquake victims;

d Establish a consultative body on post-quake reconstruction, including housing and urban planning issues, comprised of representatives of civil society and government, with a view to promoting dialogue, democratic decision-making and ensuring in the most rapid manner possible, the full realization of the right to adequate housing for everyone;

e Undertake immediate measures aimed at improving housing and living conditions at waiting centres and temporary housing sites, in a manner reflecting citizen demands and to bring such housing up to internationally acceptable standards;

f Provide increased and appropriate levels of compensation to all victims of the earthquake, in particular to the families of those killed due to post-earthquake trauma resultant from poor housing conditions and those whose houses were inadvertently demolished; both of which could have been prevented by proper governmental interventions. Also, consider seriously the provision of debt relief and no-interest loans to victims;

g Ensure the full enjoyment of the right to equality of treatment for all women, taking into account the special needs and rights of women. This should include ensuring that women are secure in their homes, free from domestic and other forms of violence and treated with full fairness and dignity;

h Prioritize the realization of the housing rights through, inter alia, special measures, in particular the rights of children, women, the elderly, the physically and mentally disabled, ethnic minorities, the homeless or any other marginalized group;

i Ensure the provision of adequate welfare assistance to all residents, not withstanding the absence of a recognized address, as a matter of human rights;

j Scrupulously abide by the legal obligations contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in particular those relating to article 11 (1), and ensure that all post-earthquake legislation, policies and plans are fully consistent with the provisions of the Covenant;

k Submit to the United Nations Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights, within the shortest possible time-frame the long overdue State report of the government of Japan; and

l Support the judicial interpretation, enforcement and implementation of articles 13, 14, 22, 25, 29 (1) and 29 (3) of the Constitution of Japan to collectively include all components of the human right to adequate housing.

1 Kobe-City Government

l Reexamine the special cases of those in parks and waiting centres with a view to finding appropriate housing solutions, within their previous communities for those who are aged, impaired, with children or with very low-incomes;

2 Reexamine the option of siting temporary housing on the outskirts of the city and the provision of all new temporary housing within 1 km. of previous sites through a process of negotiation with landowners, renters and using all possible public lands at their disposal;

3 Given that the first permanent public housing units will only become available in 1996-97 and that the programme may well last until early 1999, the modification of current temporary housing in remote sites should be taken up immediately. This should include proper foundations, ramps of adequate quality soundproof partitions, thermal insulation and heating for the winter and modification of bathrooms and circulation for the aged and elderly. In addition, roads, basic medical, shopping and child-care and education facilities should be accessible within an acceptable distance;

4 A formal forum to advise and guide the reconstruction process should be established with representatives from all stakeholders in the process: city and prefectural government, corporations, city council members, volunteers and NGOs, professionals and most importantly representatives
in each ward, with special representation of women, the aged and
impaired population and minorities. This forum would help review and ground proposals for earthquake rehabilitation and ensure a consensus in decision making through a process of truly participative decision making;

5 A formal process of establishing community and neighbourhood groups that are elected/selected from each significant neighbourhood/community should be enabled. Special representation should be ensured for women, the aged, impaired and minorities. These groups would in turn select their own representatives to the city level forum and be responsible for local initiatives, arbitration. l and adjustment, planning and future disaster mitigation activities;

6 Linkage of a rapid survey of the affected victims with the National Census and the establishment of a data-base to track the impact of the disaster on them and progressive rehabilitation;

7 Strengthening the social welfare staff handling the cases of earthquake affected communities and establish a formal linkage and forum for volunteers and NGOs to interact with officials. The definition responsibility of ward areas and sectors of support of both volunteers and welfare staff should be made transparent and public;

8 The publication of a weekly newsletter providing information on the status of the programme to all earthquake affected households and regular notification in local newspapers and TV stations; and

9 Flood lighting must be provided in all abandoned houses and in areas where houses have been demolished.

2 Hyogo Prefectural Government

1 Prepare a realistic disaster mitigation plan that reflects the objective risk (independent of budgetary constraints )and vulnerability of buildings, public participation in planning and appropriate, legal, fiscal and financial incentives. Drawing on the experience of other programmes such as in Mexico city may be useful;

2 Establish a formal forum for negotiation between landowners who wish to sell or rent property for housing-potential renters, city-governments, construction agencies and financing agencies to aid redevelopment. A package of legal, fiscal and financial incentives to aid this process should be examined. Examining the process in California may be useful;

3 Re-examine the standards for temporary housing and advice to the city governments on the sources of funds and mechanisms to modify these houses;

4 Consider the possibility of a subsidy on transport for low-income households living in distant sites and simultaneously increase the frequency of site visits by case-workers to the homes of the elderly, impaired and sick;

5 Information on economic and social rehabilitation should be provided at the community level through regular information bulletins and visits by staff, existing staff could be increased and supplemented by volunteers operating under a structured programme of support;

6 Establishing a technical support cell with strong public education capabilities to inform residents about strengthening and repair measures and set up a roster of approved consultants and construction firms after appropriate training and certification.

3 Government of Japan

1 Establish a Sub-Bureau of Disasters that undertakes the periodic task of developing regional and urban risk and vulnerability zoning databases for disasters using the considerable professional research expertise in the country. Disaster scenarios should be constructed for especially vulnerable regions and cities to explore worst-case policy and management options.

This agency may also be responsible for the coordination of regional and city-level disaster mitigation and management plans and establishing an emergency protocol to ensure that the administrative failures that took place during the Kobe earthquake do not recur. Appropriate amendment of the relevant Emergency legislation may be in order.

This agency would also be responsible for coordinating the official process of damage assessment and detailed socio-economic survey of victims that should necessarily follow a disaster. It could set up and train a panel of experts, professionals and corporate institutions who's services could be pressed into action following an major disaster. It would also serve as an nodal centre for monitoring disasters and disaster mitigation in other parts of the world, especially institutional and technical innovations that could be adopted in Japan;

2 Re-examine the standards for temporary housing based on field research of acceptable standards by various population groups and the Kobe experience. After consultation with the building industry a national design competition may be held. Appropriate stock piles of temporary housing may be made in strategic locations to respond to a future disaster rapidly;

3 Seriously re-examine the system of insurance coverage for earthquake and fire with the appropriate mechanisms to assess risk on a geographically explicit manner and fiscal and financial instruments and incentives to existing insurance institutions to take up this task expeditiously. The
experience of other countries in this regard may be useful;

4 Re-examine the minimum standards for emergency housing, food, water, energy and basic needs in keeping with Japanese standards and requirements of UN human rights conventions and establishing a national emergency fund from which these expenses can be made before budgetary provisions can be made;

5 Publish and widely disseminate a six-monthly official status report on specified classes of disasters for a minimum period of 5 years;

6 Complete the long-overdue State report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

7 Setting up an official commission of enquiry into the causes, impacts, management failures and institutional changes required after the Kobe earthquake;

8 Immediately launch an education campaign against wife assault; and

9 Ensure facilities and waiting centres do not burden women in their daily realities.

4 Professional Associations

1 Establish standards and guidelines for professional service in the case of a disaster e.g. lawyers to undertake free legal aid, counseling and arbitration;

2 Document, analyze and publicize the reasons for institutional failure and the possible mechanisms for correction and use the instruments available with the professions domain to institutionalize these changes e.g. disaster mitigation;

3 Promote inter-disciplinary dialogue to bridge the gap between theory and practice and solve practical problems that are articulated by citizens; and

4 Establish processes by which public education and participation in technical decision making can be operationalised and be given greater legitimacy and training new members of the profession in these techniques.

5 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

1 Build strong long-term relationships with communities and integrate disaster mitigation with on-going activities;

2 Build a support network of volunteers and professional to take up specific tasks during a disaster e.g. legal arbitration; community health; technical assistance during construction;

3 Establish a good working relationship and credibility with officials and the media to attempt to get feedback from communities to decision makers as rapidly as possible;

4 Strengthen abilities to catalyse participatory processes of planning and community action.

6 Community-Based Organizations (BCOs)

1 Develop a formal representative structure, when dealing with agencies like the government, with representation of all major opinions and interest groups in the community;

2 Network with other community groups and build common perspectives and share innovative means of aiding reconstruction;

3 Build linkages with other stakeholders e.g. landowners to enable a detailed and effective negotiation of new legal, property and economic relationships; and

4 Press for greater participation in planning and programme implementation and the right to be informed and participate.

7 Civil Society

a Within Hyogo Prefecture
Kobe, without its sense of community will be a dead city of concrete, glass and expressways. The most important value that the people of the prefecture should battle to protect is community relationships, support and neighbourhoods. This can only be done through a process of organisation and strengthening the democratic process as it already exists in Japan. New institutional forms and fora will have to be created to realise the vision of a richer and more participative future for the citizens of the region. In the words of a senior resident "It is the least we can leave of our culture to our children."

b Elsewhere in Japan
The disaster at Kobe should never be repeated again. Community based disaster mitigation has been the most effective means of saving lives and property all over the world - this must become the backbone of the Japanese effort. Much more has to be done to build bridges between official and corporate efforts and the ordinary citizen. The lessons of Kobe should enter elementary school textbooks, songs, art & literature within the year - so that it is never forgotten. As in the case of Hiroshima & Nagasaki, Japan should become the frontrunner in the world community for the cause of disaster mitigation.