Following extensive site-visits, intensive discussions with public officials, academics, lawyers, non-governmental and community-based organizations and earthquake victims themselves, combined with analysis of available written materials concerning the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Habitat International Coalitions of the view that at present, during the immediate post-quake period, and to a degree prior to 17 January 1995, significant discrepancies have been found to exist between the housing circumstances facing many thousands of Kobe residents and the international legal obligations held by the government of Japan. Many of these discrepancies can be classified as violations of international human rights law.

Prima Facie Violations of International Law

1 Lack of Citizen Participation in the Housing Process

Japan is a free and democratic society. Democracy implies full and free participation of citizens in the affairs of civil society and government. As it stands, the findings of the mission indicate that Kobe's citizens have not been afforded sufficient opportunities to participate in the housing process or in the development of housing plans, nor have they been fully consulted concerning their housing circumstances since the Great Hanshin Earthquake. A coalition of victims of the quake have, in fact, been literally shut out of the Emergency Relief Offices at Kobe City Hall. Citizens and their representatives were never consulted regarding their post-earthquake housing needs nor wishes. It is the team's understanding that a 'corporatist' and a 'top down' approach was adopted from the beginning to deal with the consequences of the disaster. In other words, economy and development first, housing rights last.

Interviews with three levels of government officials confirmed this view. The government systematically did not consider international legal instruments such as the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights nor did it fully consider its own Constitution when developing plans to cope with the aftermath of the earthquake. Despite the fact that the Kobe reconstruction plan declares that "We will support restoration-related activities initiated by the citizens", and "We will create a people-first community where each of the citizens, even though the will to contribute by those affected by the earthquake was clearly evident.

Indeed, the governmental attitude to citizen involvement in the post-quake plan was indicated in a petition presented to the FFM team which went so far as to assert that city officials blamed the earth-quake victims for their own plight by stating that "they are nuisances who squat on public space" and "they are egoists who don't want to listen to the voice of reason". Such sentiments raise doubts as to basic human rights and seem to contradict statements in the government plan that it will undertake measures towards 'promoting human rights education and raising awareness about human rights to eliminate a sense of discrimination against minorities'.

The mission itself found similar sentiments amongst certain governmental officials, both through discussions with them, as well as the attitudes taken in implementing the post-earthquake reconstruction plan. For instance, we were informed that since 14 August 1995, City officials have refused to negotiate with members of the 'Coalition of Earthquake Victims' which has raised a symbolic tent directly in front of Kobe City Hall, despite many attempts by the Coalition to do so. In response to questions by the FFM team as to why this was the case, a governmental official responded "Sometimes they just don't want to listen". This patronizing attitude towards citizens was unfortunately found frequently during the HIC mission.

The Government also summary rejected suggestions toward using privately owned lands in the city centre as locations for temporary housing sites, claiming it would be difficult to obtain the owners consent for this, that public land should be put to use first and that sites for temporary housing be larger than most inner city vacant plots.

The right to information has also been compromised in Kobe following the quake. For instance, the period of time between the announcement of the closure of the emergency shelters and the cut-off date for applying to temporary housing sites raises concerns of governmental coercion against victims. The collection of more than 10, 000 signatures protesting against the closing of the shelters indicate the scale of public dissatisfaction with this initiative taken by the government, without adequate consultation or involvement of the many thousands of people affected.

In general terms, the same applies to the development of the reconstruction plan. This is a perfect example of the type of top-down decision-making structures which dominated the political landscape following the earthquake and which continue to make it difficult for all Kobe residents to enjoy the right to housing. The plan was rammed through without reference to proper democratic procedures or popular consultation. It was made extremely difficult for citizens to give alternatives to the government plan, which not coincidentally closely resembles pre-existing redevelopment plans for large scale roads, buildings, infrastructure, etc. raising doubts as to its genuineness as a plan for solving all of the problems facing Kobe's earthquake victims. Questions as to the application due process rights also arise, in view of the fact that the City Plan was never put to a vote, despite a large movement opposed to many of the key principles pervading the plan.

2 Security to Tenure

One of the central tenets of the right to adequate housing under article 11(1) of the CESCR is legal security of tenure. The FFM findings indicate that a substantial number, indeed a large majority of Kobe's earthquake victims do not currently possess legal security of tenure; whether they are residing in tents, waiting centres, evacuations centres, privately rented prefabricated housing, temporary housing or with family members or relatives. Many of these people can be easily removed from their housing as their housing situation has not been legally recognized by the State. Even for those with limited security of tenure (temporary housing dwellers), beyond the politically agreed upon two year 'promise' made by local officials, their housing future remains unpredictable.

Many of the earthquake victims have been forced from their communities. They have been refused permission to rebuild on their own (mortgaged) land and they cannot receive the financial assistance they may need to either rebuild their destroyed homes or to rent new units. As a result the government has failed to protect the right of citizens to return to their original communities, nor have they been afforded the right to choose where they wish to reside.

3 The Right to Life

The most basic and fundamental human right, indeed, the right from which all others necessarily stem, is the right to life. The total deaths resulting from the quake was 5502 deaths (88% died in collapsed houses, 10% from fire, 2% for other reasons). Since the quake, more than 800 persons have died as a result of quake-related consequences. In total, more than 41,500 were seriously injured.

Quake related death rates were five times higher for recipients of welfare than for general population reflecting their poor and unsafe housing conditions at the time of the quake. For instance in Higashinada ward 3.89% of those who died were on welfare, whereas only 0. 68% in a wealthier ward were killed. One lawyer with whom the team spoke asserted that the Kobe quake was a "judicially caused disaster" because courts dismissed expert criticism about maintaining earthquake standards at level 5 (where it remained) rather than level 6. Experts reported that had level 6 been chosen as the safe level, many hundreds of deaths could have been prevented.

Following the quake, at least 25 earthquake victims, primarily elderly people, committed suicide. Many of the experts with whom the team spoke indicated that these could have been prevented by appropriate governmental interventions in the housing and shelter domain, a greater availability of social workers and so forth.

Post-earthquake related deaths (PERD) were admitted by the government to have resulted in the deaths of 422 people who died after 17 January from 'earthquake related' syndromes.

From the information made available to the HIC delegation it does appear that a large number of people died after 17 January 1995, as a direct result of the poor quality of the housing they occupied. Over 250 residents of the evacuation shelters were estimated to have died by medical specialists directly because of the conditions in these centres that persisted even into September 1995. This is in spite of infrastructural facilities for heating/cooling, cooking, sanitation and water being available within many of these buildings that were functioning schools and community centres.

The causes for these deaths include cold, inadequate ventilation, stress due to overcrowding and extreme lack of privacy, dehydration due to lack of access to water (especially people who are aged, sick or impaired) and malnutrition.

Medical experts claim that the bulk of these deaths were avoidable, had simple interventions been made. They also claim that a large number of people in partially damaged houses also died because of stress due to inadequate housing after the earthquake.

4 House Demolitions

Repeated warnings of the highly risk - prone situation of the city of Kobe have been issued both in technical documents and public statements by experts in Japan since the 1980s. This is because the city lies close to the tri-junction of an active fault system, part of which runs under the city. In addition, the possibility that structure of underlying strata and considerable and reclamation activities may lead to severe amplification of the ground acceleration during the earthquake and the resultant damage to both buildings and infrastructure in specific zones, was also known.

In their haste to expedite the process of reconstruction, the City-Government issued a series of notices with very short deadlines on the free demolition of buildings. This, combined with the incorrect information led a number of home owners to demolish their houses as they had no other means after the earthquake. Subsequently, a number of them claim that their houses could have been repaired and that they had been given false information.

Pursuant to article 11(1) of the Covenant, house demolitions and resultant eviction constitute a clear and unequivocal violation of the human right to adequate housing, and can only be considered acceptable if they are done in accordance with general principles of international law. When a dwelling is clearly uninhabitable, forms a threat to the life or health of a resident and once demolished, adequate compensation is paid to residents/owners, demolitions may be considered acceptable, subject as well, to a number of other concerns.

The FFM found that as a result of assessments performed by unskilled city officials and volunteers and hasty actions to expedite the process of reconstruction, the city government issued a series of notices with very short deadlines on free demolition of buildings.

This combined with incorrect or inaccurate information led a number of owners to demolish their houses themselves. Subsequently a number of house owners claim that their houses could have been repaired and that they had been given false hope of receiving new homes. While it is naturally difficult to investigate these cases (the houses having been demolished), in the event that such information is found to be correct. the government was grossly negligent in its carrying out of assessments and unwavering determination to commence in the redevelopment plan to the severe detriment of the residents of Kobe. This type of behaviour has been condemned internationally and is in direct conflict with international legal principles.

Indeed the process of damage assessment of houses does not seem to have been rigorously conducted as per the example set by Japanese earthquake engineering specialists, IAEE guidelines and international experience. The assessment process was often carried out by unqualified personnel, with little or no training. Additionally, photographs were not taken nor were measured drawings prepared of partially damaged buildings.

5 Habitability in Living Conditions and the Absence of Adequacy

The overall conditions in all types of accommodation are substantially below the standards that a wealthy democratic country like Japan could be expected to meet. In various contexts residents have been denied electricity, hot water, access to appropriate and healthy kitchen facilities, privacy, appropriately equipped households to meet physical challenges, secure, safe, violence-free environments, social support networks and security of tenure. It is questionable whether the government of Japan has fulfilled the obligation under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to devote 'the maximum of available resources' towards the full realization of all rights, including housing rights.

The normal procedure internationally after a disaster of this magnitude is that a detailed socio-economic survey of the affected population is undertaken to enable the effective planning of the rehabilitation and tracking of its performance. This has not occurred in Kobe, thus making it difficult to determine the actual scale of housing needs in the city and the daily conditions facing dwellers. Although the government publication "Hyogo Prefecture: Today & Tomorrow" states that 'everyone has a right to live in a physically and spiritually comfortable life....Hyogo will become a foundation for the well-being of prefectural residents", such rhetoric has clearly not been transformed into reality.

The same applies to the official statement that "It is Hyogo's intention that all residents, including the aged and the disabled, will live peaceful lives in their own communities in harmony. Our goal is to accomplish a new style of welfare society of equal benefit to all".

A publication entitled "The City of Kobe" (1992) issued by the Kobe City government states that "Kobe has set two target levels to reach in its efforts to improve housing standards: a minimum housing standard of 50m sq. for family of four to be secured by all households". While generally laudable in intent (to the extent that housing adequacy can be measured exclusively by square meters), it is apparent that the conditions prevailing in the temporary housing sites fall desperately below these governmental goals. Indeed, what is now temporary housing should remain temporary, not permanent.

6 quality of Construction

The quality of construction (though structurally stable to resist an earthquake and possibly a fire) leaves much to be desired: the pre-fab houses are erected on timber posts/piles of low quality that could easily rot; sites are often waterlogged and snakes and insects abound under buildings in some sites; floors are damp and waterproofing inadequate; ramps for the disabled are of bad quality and could collapse in a few seasons; a large proportion of the population reports sleep disorders because of no sound proofing and a number of old and impaired people have reported falling while trying to climb into the bathroom that has a step much higher than the living space.

7 Durability of Housing

The temporary buildings are constructed and designed to last 6 months to l year - but the bulk of the residents will be living in them for at least 2 to 3 years - as is common in most other disasters. How even the City - Government has issued permission to them to stayわr only 6 months, extendible for another 6. They are also not willing to provide a guarantee that all the people in temporary housing will be accommodated in permanent housing.

8 Location of Housing

This fact does not seem to be taken into account in the location of large clusters of temporary housing, not only outside the neighbourhood of those affected but outside the ward. Many families have been moved over 15km. from their previous location of residence - leading to severe dislocation of employment (especially when self-employed); significant fractions of limited incomes being paid towards transportation; severe stress to aged, sick and impaired people.

An essential component of housing rights as found within the CESCR is that it should be located close to essential services, employment, etc. As it stands, the temporary housing, particularly that found in the North and West of Kobe does not satisfy these requirements. Moreover, international law protects the right of individuals to reside and settle where they wish, and the right to freedom of movement and the right to choose one's residence. Thousands of Kobe residents have been tricked, lied to, pressured and compelled by the municipal government to leave their neighbourhoods and live in temporary housing, Evacuation Centres and Waiting Centres. They have been excluded from participating what should have been their personal decision as to where to live.

9 Women, Housing and Violence

The situation of many women who were affected by the earthquake and are staying with relatives requires special attention. Violence against women in the family is reported to have increased considerably as men find it increasingly difficult to cope with normal work pressure, uncertainty of housing and economic stability and the stress of having to live in confined conditions.

10 Discrimination and Disparate Impacts

The combined effect of both the earthquake and fire fell disproportionately on the poor, elderly, minorities and renters in the city. This is because most of them lived in low-quality housing stock before the earthquake as they could not afford better or did not want to step out of the strong community networks and relationships that provided them essential support. This fact has not been explicitly acknowledged by the city-Government or public policy that relates to the earthquake reconstruction or the city redevelopment plan. It is not surprising to discover that the short and long-term effects of an earthquake are not experienced equally by all sectors and groups within society. To ensure basic principles of equality, governments must provide special programmes, services, finances and housing to the most disadvantaged groups. At the same time, the government must ensure that it does not take advantage of the weakened position of the most vulnerable populations (the poor, women, children. elderly, disabled, etc. ) by exercising its relative power an unjust manner. One of the most common examples of this is giving undue priority to the interests and ideas of one group at the clear expense of another. This type of unequal and disparate treatment was found throughout the FFM. The Kobe City and Hyogo Prefectural governments did consult citizens in the reconstruction and redevelopment plans; however, they did not consult or seek to receive views from all citizens. While business leaders, company heads and others tied to corporate life were duly involved in these processes, those worst affected, the poor and generally marginalized groups who lost the most were and continue to be virtually excluded from these developments.

11 Privacy

The housing conditions found in waiting centres, evacuations centres as well as within many areas of temporary housing have generated substantial problems with regards to privacy rights and personal dignity in some instances this stems from the non - existence of walls, or the existence of very short・walls、which are only 80cm high or the general thinness and noisiness of dividing walls. remains a great deal of human shame, indignity and lack of pride, experienced by victims.

12 Welfare Issues

The HIC team discovered that the government in Tokyo has flatly denied social/public assistance to those living in what it deems 'legal' dwellings. Such measures are of questionable legality when viewed within the context of the CESCR, the Constitution of Japan or any basic principles of equality.

Moreover compensation provided to earthquake victims was very low and clearly insufficient to secure the basic necessities of life for victims. Other disasters in Japan resulted in victims receiving ten million Yen, while in Kobe victims received on average 240,000 Yen (+/- US$ 2,400).

Whether or not the finances necessary were available to the government, it is clear that these have not been utilized in a priority manner towards satisfying the housing rights of citizens. This is indicated by the fact that immediately following the quake, the Kobe city government said it would not alter or delay the City Airport Plan, which will cost the city tens of billions of Yen; money which could have been redirected towards alleviating the suffering that resulted from the quake.

Yukiomi Kishimoto, Prof of Housing at Osaka University, told the HIC mission that "Lots could be bought from those who don't have enough funds to build new homes, houses could be built on them and rented out to the original owners with a land-lease, good for a certain length of time. In such a great disaster, homes should be considered part of one's right to live, and people should be guaranteed living conditions they enjoyed before the quake. This is the government's duty".

Technical Findings

1 There is no systematic national system of designating risk zones in various parts of Japan, in spite of the highest quality of scientific data and technical personnel. Each city seems to decide its level of vulnerability on its own, usually based on budgetary considerations. This is often in contradiction with prefecture level vulnerability plans - which is a huge bottleneck during a regional disaster, because of conflicting standards, procedures and unclear definition of areas of responsibility;

2 Following an earthquake of magnitude 5.6 (JMA scale) in 1984 with its epicentre located not far from the city the city-government of Kobe held a limited consultation and prepared a handbook on earthquake design setting the local standards at magnitude 5.0 (JMA scale). This was in spite of dissenting technical opinions that the standards should be set at least at 6.0, if not more, by geological, seismological and engineering experts;

3 The failure of large elements in the city infrastructure was because of the joint effect of the low standard and the fact that structures were designed (before 1981) to meet lower specifications for design details;

4 The collapse of major infrastructure especially the railways, roads and expressways was a major factor in the post-disaster confusion in which a significant number of survivors of the earthquake died because they could not be rescued;

5 This was compounded by a series of (possibly manageable) fires that devastated the densely populated areas of Kobe for 3 days, because water supply systems broke down, local water reservoirs had not been planned for (unlike Tokyo), fire-fighters could not reach critical locations because of the collapse of infrastructure and debris of damaged buildings. This led to both loss of life and property and according to experts was "avoidable" if disaster mitigation and management had been organised effectively;

6 This was not undertaken at City-Government level, though small sample surveys by the Prefectural Government indicated a very high fraction of the population living in evacuation shelters in early March and later in July more than 50%, expressed the desire for both temporary and finally permanent public housing as they could not afford anything on the rental market, especially since most had lost all of their belongings and life savings;

7 A latent problem is that of a large number of households who have moved out of their own accord to rental housing within the city of Kobe or typically outside the city limits. Most of them are commuting large distances and are having to cope with the extraordinary rise of 30% to 100% in the rental values in Kobe after the earthquake apart from hefty down-payments of between 350,000 to 1 million Yen. Some of these households are expected to seek public housing after the relatively small amounts of relief received from the Government and savings are exhausted as the un-employment situation in Japan worsens;

8 The condition of a large number of individuals and families that are sharing accommodation with relatives is also reported to be serious. This is because Japanese houses are usually small and not designed to take long-stay guests, apart from the burden on household economics. A number of cases of women and old people being ejected from relatives homes after their welcome is over has been reported;

9 The building regulations would have to be mediated locally and it is clear that the proposed redevelopment plan would have to be completely recast after detailed public hearings in each neighbourhood;

10 A number of criticisms of the Kobe Redevelopment Plan and controversial mega-projects like the proposed island airport have been made. Since adequate data was not available to examine the impact directly on the earthquake affected population, no comments can be made. Nevertheless, as a matter of principle, the first charge of funds should be to provide permanent housing to the most vulnerable, then rehabilitating self-employed people and small and medium businesses. This can be done with relatively low investment, and could be the most effective insurance against social tensions and homelessness in the region in the future.